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MATTHEW SAG*
Fair use is often criticized as unpredictable and doctrinally incoherent-a
conclusion which necessarily implies that the copyright system is
fundamentally broken. This Article confronts that critique by systematically
assessing the predictability offair use outcomes in litigation. Concentrating on
characteristics of the contested use that would be apparent to litigants pretrial,
this study tests a number of doctrinal assumptions, claims, and intuitions that
have not, until now, been subject to empirical scrutiny.
This Article presents new empirical evidence for the significance of
transformative use in determining the outcomes of fair use cases. It also
substantially undermines conceptions of the doctrine that are hostile to fair use
claims by commercial entities and that would limit the application offair use
as a subsidy or a redistributive tool favoring the politically and economically
disadvantaged. Based on the available evidence, the fair use doctrine is more
rational and consistent than is commonly assumed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of fair use is central to modem copyright law in the United
States; however, almost every aspect of the fair use doctrine is highly contested.
Moreover, the application of fair use is conventionally presumed to be
uncertain. This assumed incoherence and unpredictability has led many to
question the value of fair use.1 The critique that fair use is merely "a lottery
1 LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 187 (2004); Michael J. Madison,
A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1525, 1666 (2004)
("Fair use is an ex post determination, a lottery argument offered by accused infringers
forced to gamble, after the fact, that they did not need permission before."); see also Thomas
F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L. REv. 1271, 1284 (2008)
("Fair use . .. remains fairly unpredictable and uncertain in many settings .... ); James
Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 167, 192 (2005) ("Fair
use... is too indeterminate a doctrine to provide a reliable touchstone for future conduct.");
Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REv. 1459, 1468
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argument" and amounts to no more than "the right to hire a lawyer" is deeply
important.2 In the digital age, innovation and freedom of expression
increasingly require the use, reinterpretation, and remixing of copyrighted
content; the fair use doctrine is often the only aspect of copyright law that
makes these activities possible. It is not simply end users who rely on fair use:
the doctrine is an essential part of the legal architecture of Internet search, Web
2.0 enterprises, and social networking technologies. If fair use is truly arbitrary
and uncertain, our copyright system is fundamentally broken. This Article
demonstrates that the uncertainty critique is somewhat overblown: an empirical
analysis of the case law shows that, while there are many shades of gray in fair
use litigation, there are also consistent patterns that can assist individuals,
businesses, and lawyers in assessing the merits of particular claims to fair use
protection.
This Article addresses the predictability of fair use by investigating the
impact of identifiable characteristics on fair use outcomes. It takes specific
doctrinal intuitions about fair use and evaluates the extent to which they are
supported by the data. Each one of these building blocks is interesting in
isolation; the aggregation of the discrete findings addresses a question of
fundamental importance-the predictability of fair use.
Fair use allows the use of copyrighted material without permission; in so
doing, it sets limits on the broad rights of copyright owners to control the
reproduction, distribution, performance, and display of their works.3 The
importance of fair use can be seen in recent marquee cases determining the
legality of new consumer technologies, 4 user-generated content,5 the limits of
(asserting that expert predictions of fair use are no better than those of the person on the
street, and possibly even worse); David Nimmer, "Fairest of Them All" and Other Fairy
Tales of Fair Use, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs., Winter/Spring 2003, at 263, 280 ("Basically,
had Congress legislated a dartboard rather than the particular four fair use factors embodied
in the Copyright Act, it appears that the upshot would be the same.").
2 LESSIG, supra note 1, at 187; Madison, supra note 1, at 1666.
3 Sections 106 and 106A of the Copyright Act of 1976 enumerate the exclusive rights
of copyright owners, and a limited set of "moral rights" pertaining to the authors of works of
visual art; however, these rights are expressly subject to sections 107 through 122 of the Act.
Section 107 provides that "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the
fair use of a copyrighted work.., is not an infringement of copyright." See 17 U.S.C.
§§ 106, 106A, 107 (2006).
4See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454-55
(1984) (holding that the manufacturer of a videocassette recorder was not liable for
copyright infringement, in part because consumer time-shifting of broadcast television for
later viewing was fair use and not copyright infringement); Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am.
v. Diamond Multimedia Sys. Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999) (strongly suggesting
that transferring music from compact disc to MP3 for personal use would be fair use and that
the manufacturers of MP3 players would not be liable for copyright infringement); A & M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 915 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that peer-
to-peer file-sharing of copyrighted music without authorization is not fair use).5 See Warner Bros. Entm't Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 551 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (finding that an unauthorized Harry Potter lexicon that contained substantial user-
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fan fiction,6 and critical reinterpretation of literature. 7 The fair use doctrine
affects film production, news reporting, political communication, teaching, and
academic research. 8 Fair use exceptions keep copyright closer to the reasonable
expectations of most people and thus help make sense of copyright law.9 Fair
use also plays an important role in enabling technological progress because
without fair use an unduly rigid application of copyright law would enable
rights holders to block important new technologies. 10 Indeed, reliance on fair
use is embedded in the core of the Internet, as it is a vital component of the
search engine business model, Web 2.0 enterprises, and social media."l Almost
no one doubts that the fair use doctrine either is, or should be, very important;
however, judges, academics, and lawyers express sharp disagreement over
different conceptions of fair use and its correct application. 12
generated content initially derived from a fan website was, nonetheless, a substantial copy of
the original J.K. Rowling novels and was not fair use).
6Id.
7 See Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that a
fictional novel recounting a meeting of Catcher in the Rye's Holden Caulfield at the age of
seventy-six with the author of that same book, J.D. Salinger, was a substantial copy of the
original novel and was unlikely to constitute fair use), vacated, 607 F.3d 68, 69 (2d Cir.
2010) (vacating injunction but agreeing defendants would not likely be able to make out
such a defense).8 See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 914 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding
that a researcher's unauthorized photocopying of articles from an academic periodical was
not fair use); Kenneth D. Crews, Fair Use and Higher Education: Are Guidelines the
Answer?, ACADEME, Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 38, 38 (criticizing "Classroom Guidelines" for
providing inadequate guidance on the application of fair use in an educational environment).
See generally Ass'n of Indep. Video & Filmmakers et al., Documentary Filmmakers'
Statement of Best Practices in Fair Use, CENTER FOR SOC. MEDIA (Nov. 18, 2005),
http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/sites/default/files/fair use final.pdf (reflecting the
views of a number of filmmakers as to what constitutes reasonable application of the fair use
doctrine).
9 See Ian Hargreaves, Digital Opportunity: A Review of Intellectual Property and
Growth, INTELL. PROP. OFF., 5, 43-44 (May 2011), http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipreview-
finalreport.pdf. Countries without a fair use doctrine have "witnessed a growing mismatch
between what is allowed under copyright exceptions, and the reasonable expectations and
behaviour of most people." Id. at 43.
l Old. at44.
11 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007); Kelly v.
Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 815-17 (9th Cir. 2003). See generally Matthew Sag,
Copyright and Copy-Reliant Technology, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 1607 (2009) (discussing the
application of the fair use doctrine to automatic copying, data-processing, and other
nonexpressive uses).
12 In his classic article on the fair use doctrine, Judge Pierre Leval concedes that his
"own decisions had not adhered to a consistent theory, and, more importantly, that
throughout the development of the fair use doctrine, courts had failed to fashion a set of
governing principles or values." Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L.
REv. 1105, 1105 (1990); see also Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp.
1522, 1530 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("Courts and commentators disagree on the interpretation and
application of the four [fair use] factors .... ").
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Fair use is often criticized as doctrinally incoherent and unpredictable in
application, 13 so much so that it has become fashionable to question the value of
fair use as a guide to decision making. 14 Scholars have subjected the fair use
doctrine to broad-ranging theoretical scrutiny and have undertaken precise
analysis of leading cases.15 However, almost all of the literature is normative,
anecdotal, or confined to particular subtopics.
There are two primary exceptions. Barton Beebe's pioneering empirical
study of the contents of fair use opinions examines the language judges employ,
the tests they use, and judicial characterizations of their own application of the
four statutory fair use factors. 16 Pamela Samuelson's systematic distillation of
modem fair use jurisprudence into common patterns, or "policy-relevant
clusters," makes a convincing case that fair use may not be as doctrinally
incoherent as many have suggested. 17 Each of these studies highlights
consistent patterns in judicial analysis within the fair use decisions. Although
this study builds upon the work of Beebe and Samuelson, it is also
fundamentally different in both its methods and its objectives. Rather than
relying on backward-looking judicial reasons and explanations for the outcomes
of fair use cases, this new study assesses the predictability of fair use in terms of
case facts which exist prior to any judicial determination. I focus directly on the
ex ante predictability of fair use and empirically test the significance of the
characteristics of disputed uses that would be apparent to potential litigants
before their cases go to trial. This approach makes it possible to test a number
of doctrinal claims and intuitions that have not, until now, been subject to
empirical scrutiny. No one has previously attempted to systematically assess the
predictability of fair use from the perspective that matters most-the point of
view of prospective litigants. This Article fills that void, using statistical
analysis to develop a clearer picture of the entire landscape of fair use cases.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II begins with a brief explanation of
the construction of the dataset and the key variables. Part III reviews the
13See Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REv. 1087, 1092-122 (2007)
(demonstrating the inconsistency of the various judicial interpretations of the fair use
defense); Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in Context, 31 COLuM. J.L. & ARTs 433, 433 (2008)
(describing fair use as "the great white whale of American copyright law," "[e]nthralling"
and "enigmatic"); Leval, supra note 12, at 1106; Nimmer, supra note 1, at 280 (noting the
malleability of fair use factors).
14 See supra note I and accompanying text.
15 In the last ten years alone, at least 237 law review articles have been devoted to the
issue of fair use-based on a Lexis search of U.S. law reviews with a title containing "fair
use," but not containing "trademark." In short, the relevant literature is vast. (Search date:
Feb. 23, 2011).16 Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005,
156 U. PA. L. REv. 549, 594-621 (2008).
17 Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2537 (2009).
Similarly, Michael Madison argues that existing case law can be reframed in terms of
"whether the defendants' uses of copyrighted material [fall] appropriately within or beyond
recognized social or cultural patterns." Madison, supra note 1, at 1623.
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extensive case law and commentary devoted to fair use and explains how
abstract doctrinal questions, such as transformative use, can be reduced to
empirically testable hypotheses. Part IV then presents the results of the
empirical tests and explores their importance. The conclusion summarizes the
principal findings of this study and their implications for fair use and copyright
in general.
II. DATA & METHODOLOGY
A. Data
This study is based on a unique dataset of more than 280 fair use cases
decided in U.S. District Courts between January 1, 1978 and May 31, 2011. The
dataset combines publicly available information from written opinions and court
records, as well as data from other sources such as company databases and the
Martindale-Hubbell directory of attorneys and law firms.18
B. Dependent Variable
This Article explores the effect of a diverse range of objective factors in fair
use litigation and determines whether the characteristics stressed in various
judicial and academic accounts are actually important in practice. How should
importance be judged? This study treats a case characteristic as important if it
affects the outcome of the fair use issue in an individual case. For clarity, this
variable is referred to as the successful assertion of fair use or more generally as
the defendant's "win rate." This study focuses on the main battleground of fair
use litigation-U.S. District Courts. From January 1978 through May 2011, the
average defendant win rate on the issue of fair use at the district court level was
39.92%.
Defendant win rate is a reliable and valid measure of the significance of
case characteristics. 19 It is reliable in the sense that different researchers looking
at the same data will agree whether a case was won or lost. At the risk of stating
the obvious, the win rate is a valid measure of importance because, across a
large number of cases, factors that are important should affect the outcomes of
cases.
The empirical approach presented here differs from the more
impressionistic review that legal scholars typically pursue. For example, at least
some authority suggests that factors such as whether a work was creative as
opposed to informational, or whether the defendant was engaged in a
commercial use, are important in deciding fair use cases. This study indicates
that these factors do not, in fact, have any significant influence on case
18 The data is available on the author's website, www.matthewsag.net.
19 Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 82-97
(2002) (providing a detailed explanation of validity and reliability in empirical measures).
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outcomes. 20 Because these factors do not appear to affect case outcomes in the
aggregate, the conclusion is drawn that they are unimportant. I do not attempt to
make a subjective assessment of the importance of the factor based on judicial
discussions in individual cases. This could be viewed as a limitation, because it
is always possible that in individual cases, certain factors will be important but
will nonetheless fail to correlate with the case outcome. However, this lack of
subjective analysis is exactly what makes this study worthwhile: there is already
an abundance of law review articles filled with subjective accounts of what
judges and academics say is important. Rather than adding yet another
subjective account, the aim of this study is to test those assertions and intuitions
objectively.
III. THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND TESTABLE HYPOTHESES
This Part reviews the extensive academic and judicial discussion of various
aspects of fair use and demonstrates how abstract doctrinal propositions can be
reduced to empirically testable hypotheses. Part III.A focuses on the statutory
expression of the fair use doctrine in section 107 of the Copyright Act. It
establishes the linkage between the four broad statutory factors set out in
section 107 and the seven separate hypotheses which are then tested in Part IV.
The remainder of Part III considers important nonstatutory theories about fair
use. Part III.B assesses the characterization of fair use as a social subsidy from
copyright owners to those in need of access to copyrighted works. It explains
how the subsidy view of fair use implies that fair use litigation should favor the
underdog, and the various ways in which that intuition can be tested. Part III.C
addresses how industry differentiation affects fair use litigation. Parts III.B and
III.C generate an additional five hypotheses that are also tested in Part IV.
A. The Statutory "Fair Use Factors "
The fair use doctrine originated as a judicially crafted exception to the
rights of copyright owners. 21 It remained one of the key nonstatutory aspects of
copyright law until Congress expressly incorporated it into the Copyright Act of
1976.22 To describe fair use as being "codified" in the 1976 Act-as people
often do-is something of an overstatement. The Copyright Act does not define
fair use, nor does it contain any definitive examples of particular fair uses.23 All
that the Act offers by way of guidance is: (1) an open list of examples "such as
20 See infra Part III.A for an explanation of these doctrinal features and Part IV.A for
the discussion of the results.
21 See generally Matthew Sag, The Prehistory of Fair Use, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1371
(2011).
22 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
23Id.
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criticism, comment, [and] news reporting" which may or may not be fair use;2 4
(2) four general factors to be considered in applying the doctrine; and (3) since
1992, a minor clarification relating to the status of unpublished works. 25
The four express factors in section 107 have had a considerable effect on
how issues of fair use are analyzed. Over the past thirty years, judges have
increasingly relied on the four factors to frame their analysis in fair use cases.
Consequently, lawyers also craft their briefs and their advice to clients around
these same factors. This is not surprising; after all, the language of section
107--"the factors to be considered shall include"-indicates that consideration
of the statutory factors is mandatory in determining whether the use of a work is
fair.26 However, these four factors were not intended to be exclusive, nor were
they intended to be so specific as to freeze judicial development of the
doctrine.27
The statutory factors are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of
the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.28
There is much more to the statutory factors than meets the eye. For
example, within the broad scope of "the purpose and character of the use" in the
first factor, courts take into account a variety of considerations, including
whether the defendant's use was commercial and whether that use was
"transformative"--a term of art in fair use jurisprudence discussed in detail
below. 29 Thus, in effect the first factor is really two separate factors. Under the
24 1d. (emphasis added); see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 561 (1985) (stating that the examples enumerated in section 107 should not be
regarded as "exhaustive," nor do they "single out any particular use as presumptively a 'fair'
use").25 Act of Oct. 24, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-492, 106 Stat. 3145, 3145 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006)) (adding "[t]he fact that a work is unpublished shall not
itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above
factors" to section 107); see also Kenneth D. Crews, Fair Use of Unpublished Works:
Burdens of Proof and the Integrity of Copyright, 31 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1, 49-52 (1999)
(discussing the legislative history of the 1992 amendment).26 See 17 U.S.C. § 107; see also Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 394 (4th Cir. 2003) (The
factors represent "only general guidance about the sorts of copying that courts and Congress
most commonly have found to be fair uses." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 448 (C.D. Cal. 1979) ("The
factors are illustrative, not definitive.").2 7 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976).
28 17 U.S.C. § 107.
2 9 A work is considered to be a transformative work if it imbues the original "with a
further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or
message." Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994); see infra notes
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umbrella of the second factor, "the nature of the copyrighted work," courts
explore two quite separate considerations: the creativity of the plaintiff's work
and whether it was published.30 The third factor, "the amount and substantiality
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole," is
refreshingly self-descriptive. 31 Under this factor, courts essentially evaluate
how much the defendant is alleged to have taken and how important that taking
was in the context of the plaintiffs work. The fourth factor focuses on the
market effect of the defendant's conduct: it might be the most important factor,
or it might be no factor at all.32
This section explores these factors in detail and proposes specific testable
hypotheses in relation to each.
1. The "Purpose and Character of the Use'" and Transformative Use
The phrase "transformative use" has loomed large in fair use jurisprudence
ever since the Supreme Court embraced transformativeness as the heart of fair
use in its 1994 Campbell decision.33 The key issue in Campbell was the extent
of permissible copying in the context of musical parody. 34 According to the
Court, parody is a form of transformative use and "provide[s] social benefit, by
shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the process, creating a new one."
35
The Court argued that the creation of transformative works, although not
necessary in every case, lies "at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of
breathing space within the confines of copyright. '36 According to Campbell,
transformativeness not only occupies the core of the fair use doctrine but also
reduces the importance of all other factors such that "the more transformative
the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like
commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use."3 7
To begin to understand transformative use, one must understand how a
transformative work differs from a "derivative work"-another important term
of art in copyright law. Section 106(2) of the Copyright Act gives copyright
owners an exclusive right to prepare derivative works based on the copyright
owner's original work.38 As defined in the statute, a derivative work takes a
41-43 and accompanying text (addressing the distinction between transformative uses and
derivative works); infra Part III.A. I (in relation to transformative use); infra Part III.A.2 (in
relation to commercial use).30 See infra Part III.A.3.
31 See infra Part III.A.4.
32 See infra Part III.A.5.
33 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (citing Leval, supra note 12, at 1111).
34 1d. at 571-72.
35 Id. at 579.
3 6 Id.
371d.
38 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006).
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preexisting work and "recast[s], transform[s], or adapt[s]" that work.39 The
kind of transformations referred to here are not necessarily "transformative" as
that term was intended by the Supreme Court in the context of fair use.40 A
transformative work, in the fair use sense, is one that imbues the original "with
a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression,
meaning, or message." 41 Thus, the assessment of transformativeness is not
merely a question of the degree of difference between two works; rather, it
requires a judgment of the motivation and meaning of those differences. The
difference between a noninfringing transformative use and an infringing
derivative work can be illustrated as follows: if Pride and Prejudice were still
subject to copyright protection, the novel Pride and Prejudice and Zombies,
which combines Jane Austen's original work with scenes involving zombies,
cannibalism, and ninjas, would be considered a transformative parody of the
original, and thus fair use rather than infringement.42 In contrast, a more
traditional sequel would merely be an infringing derivative work.
43
In the wake of Campbell, lower courts have arguably muddied the
definition of transformative use by applying the label to a wide range of uses
beyond parody. Substantial copying of a novel in the service of criticism was
regarded as transformative in Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.,44 as was
copying to create a new work of art with no obvious critical element in Blanch
v. Koons.45 Copying without modification was regarded as transformative in
Savage v. Council on American-Islamic Relations, Inc., where the Islamic
organization copied and distributed anti-Islamic statements made by Michael
Savage as part of a fundraising exercise.46 Recontextualization without
modification from one expressive context to another was seen as transformative
in Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd.47 In addition to these cases,
39 1d. § 101 (emphasis added) (defining derivative work).
40 A different term expressing the same concept would have been more helpful.
41 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
4 2 The example is analogous to Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257,
1276 (11th Cir. 2001).
43 For an example, see LINDA BERDOLL, MR. DARCY TAKES A WIFE: PRIDE AND
PREJUDICE CONTINUES (2004).
44268 F.3d at 1269-71.
45 467 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006).
46 No. C 07-6076 SI, 2008 WL 2951281, at *9 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2008); see also
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1986) ("[A]n
individual in rebutting a copyrighted work containing derogatory information about himself
may copy such parts of the work as are necessary to permit understandable comment.").
47 448 F.3d 605, 609-10 (2d Cir. 2006) (use of promotional posters in a rock biography
was "a purpose separate and distinct from the original artistic and promotional purpose for
which the images were created"); see also Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d
792, 796-98, 800-06 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that photos parodying Barbie by depicting
"nude Barbie dolls juxtaposed with vintage kitchen appliances" were fair use).
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courts have also found a number of nonexpressive uses to be transformative.48
In particular, several cases have held that automated processing and display of
copyrighted photos as part of a visual search engine is a transformative and thus
a fair use.49 This varied application makes a precise definition of transformative
difficult.
Moreover, it has been argued that applying the designation of
"transformative use" to contexts where the original copyrighted work has not
actually been altered renders the term meaningless, or at least hopelessly
imprecise.50 David Nimmer suggests that in the hands of some judges,
transformative use has no content at all and that it is simply synonymous with a
finding of fair use.51 According to Samuelson, a better approach would be to
distinguish transformative critiques, such as parodies, from productive uses for
critical commentary. Samuelson also suggests that courts should not label
orthogonal uses-uses wholly unrelated to the use made or envisaged by the
original author-as transformative uses.52 In a similar vein, I have argued in a
previous article that the term transformative use should be confined to
expressive uses of copyrighted works and that nonexpressive use should be
recognized as a distinct category of preferred use.53 Despite these sensible
criticisms and suggestions, it is likely that lower courts will continue to apply
the label of transformative use to any use they think ultimately fair, as long as a
finding of transformativeness is perceived to be necessary to avoid the
presumption of market harm attaching to commercial uses.54
This murkiness is a useful reminder of how cautious we have to be in taking
judicial conclusions as facts in any particular case and reinforces the necessity
of finding objectively verifiable measures for empirical analysis. If
transformative use has indeed become synonymous with fair use, there can be
no empirical measure of transformative use. However, taking the concept of
4 8 For a full discussion of the application of the fair use doctrine to automated and
nonexpressive uses, see Sag, supra note 11, at 1610-24, 1645-56.
49 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007); Kelly v.
Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2003); see also A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v.
iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 645 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding that the automated processing
of the plaintiff students' work in defendant's plagiarism-detection software was fair use).
50 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A][1][b]
(2011) (Those Second Circuit cases "appear to label a use 'not transformative' as a
shorthand for 'not fair,' and correlatively 'transformative' for 'fair.' Such a strategy empties
the term of meaning-for the 'transformative' moniker to guide, rather than follow, the fair
use analysis, it must amount to more than a conclusory label.").
51 Id.
52 Samuelson, supra note 17, at 2557 ("Although Campbell defines 'transformative' in
a way that encompasses uses for different purposes, copyright law will be more
comprehensible and coherent if iterative copying for orthogonal purposes is distinguished
from truly transformative uses of prior works.").
53 Sag, supra note 11, at 1647.
54 This doctrinal morass could have been avoided if the Supreme Court had more
clearly rejected the presumption against commercial fair use in Campbell.
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transformativeness at its most literal level makes it possible to test at least one
of the core meanings of the term. To the extent that transformative use means
making a new work out of an old one, then it stands to reason that stark
differences between the work allegedly copied and the defendant's work should
be indicative of transformation. This general concept is operationalized by the
variable Creativity Shift.55 Creativity Shift is set to 1 in cases where the
plaintiffs work is creative and the defendant's is informational, or vice versa.
56
In such cases, the defendant has not just created a new work, she has also
created a work in a different category. This shift in category should almost
always entail a fundamental change in purpose, which is the hallmark of
transformative use. The testable implication arising from transformative use is
then:
HI Creativity Shift makes afinding offair use more likely.
This hypothesis does not completely encapsulate every sphere of meaning
ascribed to transformative use, but it clearly captures at least one substantial
aspect of the concept.
2. The "Purpose and Character of the Use" and Commercial Use
The status of commercial fair use leaves many law students, lawyers, and
judges perplexed. The first statutory factor expressly invites consideration of
whether the defendant's use "is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes." 57 In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., the Supreme Court went so far as to declare that "every commercial use of
copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation." 58 This much
would seem to suggest a clear rule: commercial use is not fair use. Likewise, it
suggests a clear hypothesis:
H2 Commercial use by the defendant makes a finding of
fair use less likely.
However, Sony is not the final word on commercial use. As the Supreme
Court later acknowledged in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the Sony
presumption against commercial uses "would swallow nearly all of the
55 All variables referred to in the text are summarized in the Statistical Appendix, infra.
56 Creativity Shift is set to 0 in every other case.
57 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2006). This supposed distinction itself is bewildering as
educational uses have often been denied fair use protection, and there are many
noncommercial uses that have nothing to do with education.
58464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984). Similarly, the majority in Harper & Row declared that
"[t]he fact that a publication was commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor that
tends to weigh against a finding of fair use." Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
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illustrative uses listed in the preamble paragraph of section 107, including news
reporting, comment, criticism, teaching, scholarship, and research, since these
activities are generally conducted for profit."'59 In Campbell, the Supreme Court
rejected the notion that commerciality by itself had any "hard presumptive
significance." 60 Instead, the Court adopted a sliding scale in which the
transformativeness of the defendant's use dominates other factors, such as
commercialism. 61 As a result, the relevance of commercial use is contingent on
the transformative nature of the defendant's use. The implication here is an
alternative to H2:
H2* Untransformative commercial uses are less likely to be
fair uses.
This still leaves the question of how to measure commerciality in particular
cases. Part of the confusion about commercial fair use stems from a failure to
distinguish between commercial uses and uses by commercial actors. Lawyers
with limited copyright experience often reflexively suggest that the status of the
defendant as a for-profit entity makes fair use unavailable as a defense to
copyright infringement. However, a presumption against commercial actors has
no foundation in the statute, which focuses on the character of the "use," not the
identity of the user.62 Discrimination against commercial actors is also
inconsistent with the basic economic logic of copyright-copyright creates
private incentives to encourage the creation of expressive works; 63 for those
incentives to be effective necessarily presupposes commercial exploitation. 64
Put simply, if copyright assumes that "[n]o man but a blockhead ever wrote,
except for money," 65 then it makes very little sense to deny the nonblockheads
the protection of the fair use doctrine.
Recent cases have suggested that a better understanding of commercial use
focuses not on the identity of the user, but on the substitution effect of the
unauthorized copying. In A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., for example, the
district court determined that users who downloaded copyrighted music via a
free Internet file-sharing service were engaged in a commercial use because, by
distributing music files, "Napster users get for free something they would
59 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
60 1d. at 585.
6 1 ld. at 579.
62 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
63 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (Copyright promotes the creation and
dissemination of expression "[b]y establishing a marketable right to the use of one's
expression." (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558)).
64See Sag, supra note 11, at 1648.
65 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584 (alteration in original) (quoting 3 JAMES BOSWELL,
THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON, LL.D. 19 (George Birkbeck Hill ed., Clarendon Press 1934)
(1791)).
2012]
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
ordinarily have to buy."66 Defining commerciality in this way is consistent with
the essential purpose of copyright law: creating market incentives by protecting
creators of original expression from certain types of substitution, primarily
expressive substitution.67 However, this construction of commerciality is almost
exactly equivalent to the concept of market effect under the fourth factor, so
employing it here would be double counting to say the least.68
If commercial use is an independent factor that predicts the outcomes of fair
use cases, it must mean something analytically distinct from market effect. In
his recent analysis of the contents of fair use opinions, Beebe found that
although 84% of opinions address the issue of commerciality, the subfactor
appears to have no significant influence on case outcomes. 69 Beebe relies on ex
post judicial assessments of whether a use is commercial. In contrast, this study
sets aside such after-the-fact categorizations because they tell us nothing about
the ex ante predictability of fair use. This is an important difference because the
designation of "commercial use" in fair use cases sometimes confounds
common sense understandings of what is, and is not, commercial. The Oxford
English Dictionary defines the adjective "commercial" as "[e]ngaged in
commerce; trading," 70 with "commerce" defined as "[e]xchange between men
of the products of nature or art; buying and selling together; trading; exchange
of merchandise, esp. as conducted on a large scale between different countries
or districts; including the whole of the transactions, arrangements, etc., therein
involved."'71 On the other hand, case law tells us that even in the absence of
exchange, the free file sharing of copyrighted music is commercial, 72 and that
the free dissemination of a religious book by a dissident church "unquestionably
profits" that church and is thus tantamount to commercial. 73
66 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 912 (N.D. Cal. 2000); see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562
("The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is
monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted
material without paying the customary price."); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60
F.3d 913, 922 (2d Cir. 1994) (concluding that researchers at a for-profit laboratory gained an
indirect economic advantage by photocopying copyrighted scholarly articles).
67 See Sag, supra note 11, at 1630 (arguing that a number of copyright doctrines
converge around the idea that a subsequent author should be free to compete using her own
expression of facts, concepts, and ideas originating with prior authors, but not by offering an
original author's own expression to the public).
68 See infra Part III.A.5.
69 Beebe, supra note 16, at 556, 598.
70 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 552 (2d ed. 1989).
71 Id
72 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001); A & M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 912 (N.D. Cal. 2000). But see Sony
BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 672 F. Supp. 2d 217, 228 (D. Mass. 2009) (declining to
label defendant's file sharing as a "commercial use" and noting "a meaningful difference
between personal file sharing and a business strategy that exploits copyrighted works for
profit").




This study distinguishes between noncommercial and commercial uses as
those terms would likely be understood by potential litigants. 74 The category of
noncommercial use includes: (1) personal uses, such as time-shifting broadcast
television; (2) educational uses, where the defendant's use of the plaintiffs
work was related to some kind of formal education at a recognized educational
institution; (3) research uses, where the defendant's use was for the purpose of
general research and was not part of a specific product development process;
and (4) activities such as peer-to-peer file sharing that communicate the
plaintiff's work (or some derivative thereof) to the public, but without direct or
indirect commercial benefit. The defendant's use is categorized as
"commercial" if the defendant used the plaintiffs work as part of a commercial
product or service or as an intermediate step to creating a commercial product
or service.
To take account of the potential interaction of commercial use with
transformative use, I coded a separate variable to distinguish between direct and
indirect commercial exploitation. Any use of the plaintiff's copyrighted work in
a product or service sold to the public was classified as direct commercial
exploitation unless: (1) the work was only used or copied as part of an
intermediate process; or (2) the defendant had taken an extra step, applying its
own labor or creativity to somehow change the original copyrighted work.
However, the addition of new material that left the original copyrighted work
basically the same was not treated as involving an extra step. Thus, for the
purposes of this study, H3 can be restated as:
H3 Direct Commercial Use is less likely to be found to be
fair use.
3. The Nature of the Work
The next fair use factor instructs courts to consider "the nature of the
copyrighted work."'75 Over the past thirty years, courts have typically distilled
the amorphous "nature" of the work into two more tractable considerations:
whether the plaintiffs work is creative as opposed to informational; 76 and
whether the work is unpublished, as opposed to published. 77
Several prominent fair use cases from 1985 to 1992 indicated that the fair
use doctrine has no application where the plaintiffs work was unpublished. In
1985, a majority of the Supreme Court declared in Harper & Row, Publishers,
74 This distinction does not disregard the relevance of market substitution but merely
relegates it to its proper place under the fourth factor.
75 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2006).
76 See, e.g., Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ'g, 512 F.3d 522, 531 (9th Cir. 2007)
(describing song lyrics as "a work of creative expression, as opposed to an informational
work, which is precisely the sort of expression that the copyright law aims to protect"
(emphasis added)).77 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985).
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Inc. v. Nation Enterprises that "[u]nder ordinary circumstances, the author's
right to control the first public appearance of his undisseminated expression will
outweigh a claim of fair use." 78 This ruling was followed and expanded in a
series of cases in the Second Circuit.79 However, in 1992, the force of this
subfactor was blunted by an amendment to section 107, adding the following to
the statutory description of fair use: "The fact that a work is unpublished shall
not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of
all the above factors. '80 Nevertheless, it is appropriate to test the hypothesis:
H4 A finding offair use is less likely where the plaintiff's
work is unpublished.
A second aspect of the nature of the work is that, in principle, the more
creative the original work is, the more justification is required to establish a
claim of fair use.81 As the Campbell Court explained, "[s]ome works are closer
to the core of intended copyright protection than others, with the consequence
that fair use is more difficult to establish when the former works are copied. 82
Accordingly, the second factor presents another hypothesis:
H5 A finding of fair use is less likely where the plaintiffs
work is creative.
4. Amount Copied
The next statutory fair use factor is "the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole." 83 The application
of this factor is inherently bound up in the first and fourth factors: the extent of
permissible copying varies according to the purpose of the copying and the
78 Id. at 555.
79 See Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 737 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that
"[u]npublished works are the favorite sons of factor two" and that "[o]ur
precedents ... leave little room for discussion of this factor once it has been determined that
the copyrighted work is unpublished"); New Era Publ'ns Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d
576, 583 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Where use is made of materials of an 'unpublished nature,' the
second fair use factor has yet to be applied in favor of an infringer, and we do not do so
here."); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that
"unpublished works. . . normally enjoy complete protection against copying any protected
expression").
80 Act of Oct. 24, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-492, 106 Stat. 3145, 3145 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006)).
81 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).
82 Id.
83 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2006).
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effect of the copying on the rightsholder. 84 Accordingly, the third factor is
usually said to be both qualitative and quantitative.
85
The contextual element in the third factor makes it challenging to reduce to
a simple empirical question. There is, however, a reasonably objective
distinction that illuminates the role played by this factor. In most cases it is easy
to distinguish between a defendant accused of making a complete copy of the
plaintiff's work and one who is accused of making only a partial copy. Thus,
the relevant hypothesis in relation to the third factor is:
H6 A finding offair use is more likely where the defendant
uses only part of the plaintiff's work.
5. Market Effect
The final statutory factor is "the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work."'86 Although the Supreme Court once
commented that this factor is "undoubtedly the single most important element
of fair use," 87 subsequent cases have retreated from that position. In its most
recent fair use decision, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the Supreme Court
notably failed to stress the market effect factor; it insisted instead that "[a]ll
[statutory factors] are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light
of the purposes of copyright. '88
In his investigation, Beebe noted that of the 141 judgments finding that the
market-effect factor disfavored the defendant, all but one also ruled against the
defendant on the ultimate issue of fair use. 89 Finding a 99% correlation in an
empirical study is a bit like finding that 99% of Iraqis voted for Saddam
Hussein-it is a statistic so impressive that it engenders disbelief.90 Although
market effect has the ring of an objective factual investigation, it is in fact a
highly subjective assessment. In most cases, the judgment as to whether the
defendant's conduct falls foul of the fourth factor is somewhat elastic because
to ascertain the extent of potential market effect, courts must first determine
whether a given use is within the potential market. The proper scope of the
plaintiff's current and future copyright markets is thus an input, throughput, and
output of this analytical process. 91 In light of this imprecision, the apparent
84 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587.
85 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565-66 (1985).
86 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
87 Harper&Row, 471 U.S. at 566.
88 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578.
89 Beebe, supra note 16, at 617.
90John F. Bums, A Show of Loyalty (Just Say Yes) in Iraq Vote for the One and Only,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 16, 2002, at Al.
91 See Matthew Sag, God in the Machine: A New Structural Analysis of Copyright's
Fair Use Doctrine, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 381, 392-95 (2005). Jim Gibson
argues that the circularity of the market-effect determination combined with risk-averse
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symmetry between the way judges describe the fourth factor and the outcomes
of fair use cases raises the suspicion that market effect is no factor at all.92
The question then becomes: Is there any empirical content to the fourth
statutory factor, or is it merely a legal conclusion? The simplest way to
understand the market-effect factor is as an inquiry into competitive injury or
lost sales. Conceived as such, the empirical question is just a matter of finding
that injury or those lost sales. This inquiry is easy to conceive but harder to
implement because the extent of past losses and probable extent of future losses
are keenly contested elements in most fair use trials.
Although it is hard to verify the likely extent of market interference in any
particular case, it seems intuitive that the likelihood of competitive injury
increases when the plaintiff and defendant are in the same industry. To analyze
this issue, each plaintiff and defendant in the dataset was assigned an industry
classification based on the North American Industry Classification System
(NAICS).9 3 This data was then used to generate an Industry Separation dummy
variable (a variable that is either 0 or 1) indicating whether plaintiff and
defendant were in the same industry (Industry Separation = 0) or not (Industry
Separation = 1).94 The testable hypothesis relating to market effect is:
H7 Industry Separation makes a finding of fair use more
likely.
This section has established the motivation for several testable propositions
in relation to the statutory fair use factors and the various subfactors that have
emerged from the case law over the past thirty years. The remainder of this Part
explores additional theories about fair use which are less closely tied to the
statutory text.
B. Does Fair Use Favor the Underdog?
Both judges and academics have characterized the fair use doctrine as a
redistributive tool favoring the politically and economically disadvantaged. For
example, in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., Justice
Blackmun characterized the fair use doctrine as "a form of subsidy" at the
licensing practices causes the inexorable expansion of copyright and a parallel reduction in
the scope of fair use. See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual
Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 895-98 (2007).92 See Beebe, supra note 16, at 620-21 (reaching the same conclusion).
9 3 NAICS codes are "used by Federal statistical agencies in classifying business
establishments for the purpose of collecting, analyzing, and publishing statistical data related
to the U.S. business economy." North American Industry Classification System, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2012).94 For the purpose of measuring Industry Separation, I used two-digit NAICS codes.
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expense of authors that permits limited use of a work "for the public good. '95 A
number of scholars have also emphasized the function of fair use in
redistributing value from copyright owners to "preferred classes of users. 96
This characterization is not neutral, it reflects a skeptical or grudging view of
fair use. After all, subsidies are treated with great skepticism in a free market
economy, and so the subsidy view of fair use naturally suggests that the
doctrine's benefits should be reserved for the truly deserving, if not eliminated
altogether.97
What is the foundation for this view? There is an intuition that fair use is
some kind of social subsidy favoring underdog defendants-defendants who
lack status, power and money, particularly compared to their litigation
opponents. This underdog view of fair use arises, in part, from the focus of the
statutory examples on activities "such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching,.. . scholarship, [and] research. '98 It also stems from the distinction
between uses made for "nonprofit educational purposes" and those of a
"commercial nature" found in the first fair use factor.99
95Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 478 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing ALAN LATMAN, FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 31
(1958); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis
of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1630 (1982)).96 Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A.
1, 15 (1997) (emphasizing the "redistribution" of value from copyright owners to preferred
classes of users); Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, and Sui Generis Protection of
Databases in the United States and Abroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 151, 169 (1997) (viewing
fair use as subsidy from copyright owner in favor of uses with public benefits); see also 2
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 12.2.2.1(a) (Supp. 2011) (observing that the
"commercial-noncommercial distinction" in fair use can be characterized as "a covert
subsidy to worthy nonprofit enterprises such as schools and universities"); Robert P. Merges,
The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the "Newtonian" World of On-Line
Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 135 (1997) (characterizing fair use as a tax on
copyright owners and a subsidy in favor of certain classes of users).9 7 See, e.g., LEE WILSON, FAIR USE, FREE USE AND USE BY PERMISSION: HOW TO
HANDLE COPYRIGHTS IN ALL MEDIA 67 (2005) ("Fair use is a kind of public policy exception
to the usual standard for determining copyright infringement"; fair use requires a
"countervailing public interest ... [that] typically creates some social, cultural or political
benefit."); NII Copyright Protection Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R. 2441 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th
Cong. 75 (1996) (statement of Barbara A. Munder, Senior Vice President of the McGraw-
Hill Companies and Chair of the Information Industry Association Board of Directors)
(arguing that the burden of subsidizing access "is a broader societal responsibility, not one
that should be borne primarily-let alone exclusively-by copyright owners"). Of course,
many commentators resist the label of subsidy precisely because once fair use is identified as
such it becomes easier to argue for its elimination. See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to
Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 354, 363 (1999) (arguing that "the public domain is not a 'subsidy to users').
98 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
991d. § 107(1).
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Furthermore, the intuition that fair use favors the underdog can also be
traced to the predominant law and economics account. In her influential 1982
article, Fair Use as Market Failure, Wendy Gordon argued that fair use should
be understood as a doctrine justifying unauthorized copying in instances of
market failure in general, and high transaction costs in particular.100 Fair use has
commonly been found in situations where the cost of collecting a license fee
would exceed the license fee itself.101 This view is easy to reconcile with the
statutory text: the fourth fair use factor considers the "effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work"--there is no market
effect where there is no effective market. 102 Accordingly, the market-failure
view leads to a preference for the underdog because an underdog's failure to
pay the customary price for a particular copy of a work is less likely to
adversely affect the copyright's broader market. The underdog is also, in
general, a less concentrated interest, and thus the transaction costs of collecting
royalties are likely to be higher, so it is more likely that the costs of collection
would exceed potential revenue.
Testing the doctrinal intuition that fair use favors the underdog involves
reducing that general proposition to something more concrete. Although
litigants do not come to court with the labels "underdog" and "overdog"
stamped across their foreheads, there is a well-developed literature exploring
the divergent experience of the "haves" and "have-nots" in litigation. 10 3 This
study borrows extensively from this literature to suggest appropriate measures
of underdog status.
1. Legal Personality as a Measure of Underdog Status
Overdogs and underdogs are conventionally defined in terms of status,
power, and resources.104 In studies of Supreme Court decision making, it is
commonplace to classify governments and corporations as overdogs because
they are presumed to have more resources and higher status and, for similar
reasons, to classify individuals as underdogs. 10 5 Although it is possible to
100 Gordon, supra note 95, at 1627-35 (arguing that fair use exception to the exclusive
rights of copyright can only be justified by the presence of market barriers such as high
transaction costs, externalities, nonmonetizable benefits, or antidissemination motives); see
also Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of
Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 48-56 (1997) (focusing on
externalities).
101 See Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 518 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.)
102 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
10 3 Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves " Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 95, 97-114 (1974) (summarizing the literature).
104Id. at 97.
105 See, e.g., S. Sidney Ulmer, Selecting Cases for Supreme Court Review: An Underdog
Model, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 902, 903 (1978) (examining litigant status as an independent
variable in Supreme Court decision making and finding that liberal justices supported
underdogs and conservative justices supported upperdogs).
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measure status and empowerment in many different ways, one of the most
common approaches is to reduce the question to legal personality: i.e., whether
a party is an organization or an individual natural person. 10 6 One of the pioneers
of this field, Marc Galanter, argues that the well-resourced repeat players are
almost always organizations. 10 7 Consequently, the superiority of the "haves"
over the "have-nots" can be tested simply by comparing the fortunes of
organizations, businesses, and government bodies against individual natural
persons. 10 8 There is a large body of evidence to suggest that overdogs are
indeed advantaged by their superior financial resources, their greater experience
with the legal system, and their ability to strategically settle unfavorable
cases. 109
In general, the evidence suggests "that organizations do better than
individuals in almost every kind of litigation, at almost every stage, and as both
plaintiffs and defendants."' 10 For example, in a study of the success of
appellants before selected U.S. Courts of Appeals, Donald Songer and Reginald
Sheehan found that "It]he success rates of appellants consistently increase with
each incremental increase in their strength relative to the strength of the
respondent."' I Accordingly, the notion that fair use favors the underdog leads
to the testable implication that:
H8 A finding offair use is more likely if the defendant is a
natural person.
Unfortunately, at least from an empiricist's perspective, the doctrinal intuition
that fair use favors the underdog cuts against the obvious and well-established
disadvantages of the underdog in litigation. The litigation literature establishes a
106 See Marc Galanter, Planet of the APs: Reflections on the Scale of Law and Its Users,
53 BuFF. L. REv. 1369, 1389 (2006).
107 See id.108 Id
1091d. at 1389-98.
10 Id. at 1389; see also Terence Dunworth & Joel Rogers, Corporations in Court: Big
Business Litigation in U.S. Federal Courts, 1971-1991, 21 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 497, 557
(1996) (finding a 17 percentage point success gap in favor of Fortune 2000 companies as
plaintiffs in federal cases and 29 percentage point success gap as defendants); Theodore
Eisenberg & Henry S. Farber, The Litigious Plaintiff Hypothesis: Case Selection and
Resolution, 28 RAND J. ECON. S92, S99, S101 (1997) (finding a success gap for corporate
plaintiffs versus individual plaintiffs of 23 percentage points in federal diversity cases not
including personal injury cases).
" 'lDonald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Who Wins on Appeal? Upperdogs and
Underdogs in the United States Courts of Appeals, 36 AM. J. POL. Sci. 235, 246 (1992); see
also Donald R. Songer et al., Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead over Time? Applying
Galanter's Framework to Decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1925-1988, 33 LAw &
Soc'Y REV. 811, 827-31 (1999) (finding that the "haves" win more frequently in published
decisions, even after controls are introduced for the ideological makeup of the panel).
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strong prior that, compared to corporate entities, natural persons will fare badly
in litigation. I address this issue in more detail in Part IV below.
2. Legal Representation as a Measure of Underdog Status
Based on the intuition that underdogs would not have the same access to
legal services as overdogs, the characteristics of the parties' attorneys and law
firms may provide another measure of empowerment. I cross-referenced court
records with the widely used Martindale-Hubbell directory to determine
experience ratings for the individual attorneys and law firms in each case.112
The variables used in this analysis relate to the Martindale-Hubbell "AV"
ranking for attorneys and law firms. An AV ranking indicates that the lawyer
(or firm) in question received an average rating of 4.5 or above out of 5 and is
regarded as "preeminent" by his or her peers. 113 Only 40% of plaintiffs and
51% of defendants retained as their principal representative an attorney with the
highest possible Martindale-Hubbell rankings. A preference for acclaimed
experience was more apparent in the selection of law firms: 81% of plaintiffs
and 77% of defendants chose law firms with the highest possible Martindale-
Hubbell rating.
Comparing the representation of both sides in each case, I generated
dummy variables to indicate those cases where the plaintiff availed itself of
AV-rated lawyers (or law firms) and the defendant did not. 114 It is important to
stress that these measures are comparative. The hypothesis here is that if fair
use favors the underdog defendant, those defendants who retain less
experienced attorneys and law firms than their opponents will actually be more
likely to be advantaged by the application of the doctrine. This implies two
related hypotheses:
H9 If the defendant is an underdog in terms of attorney
representation, afinding offair use is more likely; and
HO If the defendant is an underdog in terms of law firm
representation, afinding offair use is more likely.
112 See Peer Review Ratings, MARTINDALE.COM, http://www.martindale.com/xp/legal/
AboutMartindale/Products andServices/PeerReviewRatings/ratings.xml (last visited
Feb. 24, 2012).113 Id. According to Martindale-Hubbell, their Peer Review Ratings evaluate lawyers in
the United States and Canada based on the anonymous opinions of members of the bar and
the judiciary. Id. Attorneys with less than three years' experience are unlikely to have a
Martindale-Hubbell rating because the company usually conducts its first review three years
after bar admission. See id. Attorneys with an average score of 4.5 to 5 out of 5 receive an
"AV" or "Preeminent" rating, which, according to Martindale-Hubbell, is a "testament to the
fact that a lawyer's peers rank him or her at the highest level of professional excellence." Id.
114 The plaintiff/defendant correlations for attorney ratings and firm ratings were quite
low: .13 and .06 respectively. This data was not available for analysis for the years between
2007 and 2011 at the time of writing.
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As before, these hypotheses contradict the general expectation that higher-
rated lawyers and more prestigious law firms should ordinarily obtain superior
results for their clients. 115 Although the intuition that better lawyers will
produce more favorable outcomes is both obvious and appealing, there is
surprisingly little evidence to that effect. Most importantly for this study, it is
not clear that lawyer prestige translates to lawyer quality as measured in case
outcomes. For example, in a recent study of public defenders randomly assigned
to felony cases in Nevada, David Abrams and Albert Yoon conclude that more
experienced lawyers produced better outcomes, but the authors did not find any
significant differences in sentencing based on the attorney's legal educational
background.1 6 More generally, Haire, Lindquist, and Hartley find only mixed
support for the proposition that attorney expertise influences litigant success in
civil cases. 117 Thus, although one might expect attorney and firm ratings to
show a positive correlation with litigation outcomes, the extant literature
suggests this can only be a weakly held prior.
C. Industry Effects
Dan Burk and Mark Lemley have made a strong case for the importance of
industry variation in patent law. 118 It stands to reason that a similar
phenomenon might apply in copyright law. The same NAICS data used to
generate the industry separation variable referred to above can also be used to
chart industry differences in fair use litigation. 1
19
115 Another issue to consider is that the selection of lawyers and law firms in the dataset
is not the product of random assignment. The parties decide how much to invest in legal
services based on their anticipation of the risks and rewards of litigation and their own
perceptions of the incremental advantage that can be obtained by retaining more experienced
counsel. There is no obvious way to control for the endogeneity of these factors. See
generally Stanton Wheeler et al., Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead? Winning and Losing in
State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970, 21 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 403 (1987) (comparing solo
practitioners to lawyers practicing in firms and partnerships in state supreme court cases and
finding that stronger parties tended to retain attorneys affiliated with a firm and that clients
represented by firms fared better).116 David S. Abrams & Albert H. Yoon, The Luck of the Draw: Using Random Case
Assignment to Investigate Attorney Ability, 74 U. CHi. L. REv. 1145, 1168 (200.7). A
defendant assigned to an attorney in the top 10% of experience had an average incarceration
rate 14 percentage points lower than one with an attorney in the bottom 10%. Id. at 1173. A
similar comparison of expected sentence length yields an expected sentence reduction of 1.2
months, simply due to the experience of the randomly assigned attorney. Id. at 1170.117 See generally Susan Brodie Haire, Stefanie A. Lindquist & Roger Hartley, Attorney
Expertise, Litigant Success, and Judicial Decisionmaking in the US. Courts of Appeals, 33
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 667 (1999) (reviewing products liability cases decided from 1982 to
1993).
118 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1578 (2003) (finding that patent doctrine varies significantly by industry).
119 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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As seen in Figures 1 and 2 (below), for both plaintiffs and defendants, the
"Information" industries dominate fair use litigation (41% and 52%,
respectively). In the NAICS coding scheme, the "Information" category
includes publishing, sound recording, motion pictures, telecommunications,
radio, satellite, television, data processing, and libraries and archives. 120 For
defendants, no other category accounts for more than 10% of the population;
whereas, not surprisingly, the "Arts, Entertainment and Recreation" group
accounts for 20% of plaintiffs.121
Figure 1: Plaintiff Industries (Major Categories)
Information
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120 See 2007 NAICS Definition, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/cgi-
bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch?chart code=5 1&search=2007 NAICS Search (last visited Feb. 24,
2012). The NAICS codes for the "Information" category are 511110 to 519190. Id.
121 The "Arts, Entertainment and Recreation" category, NAICS codes 711110 to
713990, includes theatre companies, dance companies, music groups, sports teams,
promoters of performing arts, sports, and similar events, independent artists, writers, and
performers as well as museums, zoos, amusement parks, casinos, golf courses, and other
amusement or recreational facilities. 2007 NAICS Definition, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch?chartcode=7 1 &search=
2007 NAICS Search (last visited Feb. 24, 2012).
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The population in this study is too small to test the significance of individual
industries on fair use outcomes; however, it is possible to test the more general
hypothesis that the Industry Group variable will be a significant factor in fair
use outcomes. Accordingly, the final two hypotheses are:
Hi] Plaintiff Industry Group is a significant factor in fair
use outcomes; and
H12 Defendant Industry Group is a significant factor in fair
use outcomes.
Even if Industry Group does not turn out to be significant, it is important to
include some measure of industry effects in the regression model as a control
variable in order to reduce the chances that effects observed in relation to other
variables are not simply a product of unobserved characteristics associated with
either plaintiff or defendant. Including Industry Group in the analysis does not
preclude this possibility, but it goes some way toward minimizing it.
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IV. RESULTS
A. Overview of Results
The previous Part demonstrated how substantial doctrinal questions relating
to fair use can be translated into three clusters of testable hypotheses. This Part
presents the results of the empirical analysis in both tabular and graphical form.
To review, the first cluster of testable hypotheses consists of implications
arising directly from the four statutory fair use factors:
Hi Creativity Shift makes afinding offair use more likely;
H2 Commercial use by the defendant makes a finding of
fair use less likely;
H3 Direct Commercial Use makes a finding offair use less
likely;
H4 A finding of fair use is less likely where the plaintiff's
work is unpublished;
H5 A finding of fair use is less likely where the plaintiff's
work is creative;
H6 A finding offair use is more likely where the defendant
uses only part of the plaintiff's work; and
H7 Industry Separation makes a finding of fair use more
likely.
The second group of propositions relates less directly to the statutory text of
section 107. Instead, these hypotheses flow from judicial and academic
commentary in relation to the fair use doctrine. These additional hypotheses are:
H8 A finding offair use is more likely if the defendant is a
natural person;
H9 If the defendant is an underdog in terms of attorney
representation, afinding offair use is more likely, and
H10 If the defendant is an underdog in terms of law firm
representation, a finding offair use is more likely.
The third and final set of propositions relate to the effect of party
characteristics tied to broader industry classifications. These are:
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HI 1 Plaintiff Industry Group is a significant factor in fair
use outcomes; and
H12 Defendant Industry Group is a significant factor in fair
use outcomes.
Table 1 (below) reports the results of five separate multivariate logit
regressions analyzing the relationship between a finding in favor of fair use (the
dependent variable) and the various factors discussed in Part III (the
independent variables). 122
Model 1 shows the effect of the statutory factors on fair use. The remaining
models reported in Table 1 are variations of the first model. Model 2 adds
variables relating to underdog status to the analysis of the core statutory factors.
Model 3 combines the statutory factors with the plaintiff and defendant industry
variables. Model 4 combines the statutory factors with the underdog natural-
person variables and the plaintiff and defendant industry variables. Model 5
contains all three groups of variables and should be considered as the main
finding of this study.123 Each of the regression models also contains a variable
(Post 1994) indicating whether the decision was before or after the Supreme
Court's 1994 ruling in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.124 This time-trend
variable is designed to account for the possibility that Campbell represented a
fundamental realignment of fair use doctrine.
[Tabular material on following page.]
122 Logit (or logistic regression) is a regression model designed for estimation of binary
outcomes. I report logit results, but I have also verified the results using probit (another
regression model designed for estimation of binary outcomes) and ordinary least squares
(which is more suitable for a linear regression model); and the results are substantively the
same in all relevant respects. See infra Statistical Appendix.12 3 Model 4 addresses the missing data problem created by the incompleteness of the
attorney and law firm experience data. See supra note 114. Omitting these variables allows
me to run the regression over almost all of the data, whereas Model 5 is limited to 222 cases
out of 283.
124 5 10 U.S. 569 (1994).
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Table 1: The Effect of Various Objective Factors on a Finding
in Favor of Fair Use (Multivariate Logit Regression)
Regression Model
Doctrinal Basis Variable Finding of Fair Use
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Transformative Creative Shift .995** 1.350** .872* .880* 1.313**
Use (.35) (.47) (.37) (.50) (.47)
Commercial -.328 -.484 -.304 -.355 -.407
Commercial Use (.40) (.53) (.43) (.54) (.53)
Use Direct -.629* -.771* -.495 -.548' -.703*CommercialUse (.30) (.36) (.31) (.37) (.36)
Creative Work .012 -.458 -.048 -.208 -.472
Nature of the (.30) (.40) (.32) (.42) (.40)
Work Unpublished .269 .093 .073 -.002 -.005
Work (.31) (.50) (.32) (.39) (.51)
Amount .312 .781 * .308 .426 .754*
Copied Partial Copy (.27) (.36) (.28) (.48) (.36)
Market Effect Industry .448 -. 116 .207 .144 -. 199
Separation (.27) (.33) (.28) (.34) (.33)
Campbell Post 1994 .013* .097 .090 .042 .203
Effect (.30) (.33) (.30) (.30) (.34)
Plaintiff 1.568** .968** 1.299**
Natural (.42) (.46) (.45)
Person
Defendant .283 .149 .271






Defendant Law .270 .296
Firm
Underdog (.45) (.45)
Plaintiff .031** .013 .017
Industry Industry (.01) (.01) (.01)
Defendant .005 .004 .008
Industry (.01) (.01) (.01)
Constant -.585 -.551 -2.538 -1.655 -1.969
Pseudo R2  .073 .166 .089 .111 .173
N(l) = 277, N(2) = 222, N(3) = 271, N(4) = 270, N(5) = 222. ** Significant at the .01 level,
• Significant at the .05 level, # Significant at the .10 level. Logit coefficients obtained using
Robust Standard Errors. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Tables of logit coefficients are not particularly easy to read. Although
logisitic regression is usually preferred for evaluating relationships between
explanatory variables and dichotomous outcomes, it is helpful to duplicate the
analysis using linear regression such as Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). OLS
coefficients describe a constant ratio between the independent and dependent
variables, which means that one can compare the substantive impact of two
statistically significant variables simply by comparing their size. Complete OLS
results are reported in Table 2 in the Appendix. The same information can be
presented graphically to illustrate the relative substantive importance of the
various factors. Figure 3 (below) contains the same data as Table 2 in the
Appendix, but it is best understood as a visual complement to Table 1. The
hollow bars in Figure 3 indicate that the variable was not statistically
significant, gray shading indicates a significant negative coefficient (i.e., as the
value of the variable increases, fair use becomes less likely), and black indicates
a significant positive coefficient.
Figure 3: OLS Coefficients Illustrating the Effect on a Finding
















Source: U.S. District Court fair use cases
-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2 .3
OLS Coefficient
from 1978 to 2011. The coefficients illustrated
above are reported in OLS regression 5, infra Statistical Appendix, Table 2. Black coefficients are
positive, gray coefficients are negative, hollow bars represent coefficients that are not statistically
significant.
The interpretation and implications of these results are explored in detail in
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B. The Core Statutory Fair Use Factors
1. Transformative Use
The Creative Shift variable was statistically significant in each of the five
model specifications. 125 The positive and significant coefficient associated with
Creative Shift shows that, as predicted in Hi, this proxy measure for
transformative use makes a finding of fair use more likely. Recall that Direct
Commercial Use might also be thought of as an indicator of transformative
use. 126 The significant negative coefficient for Direct Commercial Use confirms
H3, that direct commercial use makes a finding of fair use less likely. 127
These results are not merely statistically significant in a technical sense;
they are also clearly substantive. One way to see this is to compare the size of
the OLS coefficients in Figure 3. Another way is to calculate the average
predicted probability of a finding in favor of fair use under particular scenarios.
For example, based on the regression in Model 5, the predicted probability of a
finding in favor of fair use is .62 if there is a Creative Shift, but only .33
otherwise. 128 This means that, holding everything else constant, the chances of a
fair use win are almost double, increasing from 33% to 62%, when this kind of
transformative use is present. In other words, not knowing anything else about
the defendant's use, a plaintiff can expect to win a clear majority of cases where
there is no indication of transformative use, but otherwise expect to lose all but
38% of the time.
The substantive effect of Direct Commercial Use is similarly impressive.
The predicted probability of a finding in favor of fair use is .29 if the defendant
is making a direct commercial use, and .47 otherwise. In addition, the
combination of these two effects is also substantively important. For example,
the predicted probability of a successful assertion of fair use if there is Creative
Shift and the defendant is not engaged in a direct commercial use is .72-i.e.,
more than seven cases in ten.
Does this prove that transformative use is the alpha and omega of fair use?
Not quite. Although certain core aspects of transformative use are captured in
125 Although the significance of some variables is noted at the .10 level, this study relies
primarily on results that meet the usual .05 standard. If a variable is significant at the .05
level, either the null hypothesis that the variable is not significant is wrong, or the patterns
observed in the data are the product of the sort of random chance that one would expect to
see in only 5% of similar regressions. MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN, BASIC CONCEPTS OF
PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS IN THE LAW 54 (2009). Importantly, failing to reject the null
hypothesis at a given level of significance does not automatically mean that the null is
correct. See ROBERT M. LIEBERT & LYNN LANGENBACH LIEBERT, SCIENCE AND BEHAVIOR:
AN INTRODUCTION TO METHODS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 92 (4th ed. 1995).126 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
127 Direct Commercial Use is significant in four out of the five versions of the
regression models.
128 Predicted probabilities range between 0 and 1 and are rounded to two decimal places.
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the Creative Shift and Direct Commercial Use variables, these variables do not
account for every aspect of transformative use. The most obvious indication of
the shortcomings of the Creativity Shift measure is that it would not indicate
that the defendant in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 129-the first judicial
invocation of the term transformative use-was engaged in a transformative
use. Nonetheless, the evidence emphatically confirms the significance of at least
these core components of transformativeness in fair use litigation.
2. Amount and Substantiality
The variable Partial Copy was not significant in every regression model;
however, it was significant in Model 5, which combines all of the variables of
interest together.130 The significance of Partial Copy in the final model
specification means that, controlling for certain attributes of legal personality
and legal representation, Partial Copy is a significant predictor of fair use. 131
The average predicted probability of fair use for cases involving partial copying
is .44, whereas it is only .34 in those involving total copying. Thus, although its
significance depends on the model specification, it seems reasonable to
conclude that, consistent with H6, a finding of fair use is more likely where the
defendant uses only part of the plaintiff's work.
3. The Remaining Statutory Factors
The other statutory fair use factors were not significant. Commercial Use,
Creative Work, Unpublished Work, and Industry Separation are insignificant
across all five regression models. It must be stressed here that failure to find an
effect is not the same thing as finding no effect. 132 It is possible that a different
research design or simply more data could lead to a different result' 33
Nonetheless, for the moment what can be said is that there is no evidence that
commercial use, the creative or unpublished nature of the copyrighted work, or
market effect (measured in terms of industry separation) play any objectively
ascertainable role in determining the outcome of fair use cases.
129 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
130 The difference between Models 4 and 5 is the inclusion in the latter of the variables
relating to attorney and law firm expertise-it is not clear why Partial Copy would be
insignificant when these variables are absent, but significant when they are present. The
most likely explanation is that the missing attorney experience data is correlated with a
particular time period.
131 Interestingly, there are no significant correlations between these factors and the
partial copy variable.13 2 See LIEBERT, supra note 125, at 92.
133 Although it should be noted that the results were the same when this analysis was
initially performed with data ranging between 1978 and 2006.
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C. Party Status Variables
The party status and empowerment variables in Models 2, 4, and 5 yield
some interesting results. The coefficient for Plaintiff Natural Person is positive
and significant in each of the relevant specifications. Put simply, a finding of
fair use in favor of the defendant is more likely if the plaintiff is a natural
person and less likely if the plaintiff is a corporation. How important is this
effect? Returning to Figure 3 (above) indicates that this factor, which has no
direct relevance to the statutory fair use guidance, may be the most important
predictor of litigation. The poor showing of natural-person plaintiffs is
consistent with the well-developed literature on the success of "haves" over the
"have-nots" in litigation discussed in Part 111.134 However, it is in direct
opposition to the notion that fair use favors the underdog and it undermines the
characterization of fair use as a redistributive tool favoring the politically and
economically disadvantaged.135
The Defendant Natural Person coefficient is not significant in either
direction. Conceivably, given the manifest disadvantages of the underdog in
litigation, this null result may be a product of the collision of a fair use
underdog effect and a more general litigation overdog effect. There are,
however, many other possible explanations for the failure to find an effect,
including selection effects, the relatively small size of the study population, and
the potential for omitted variable bias.
Defendant Attorney Underdog produces a negative and significant
coefficient in Models 2 and 5. This suggests that defendants who come to court
with less experienced attorneys than their opponents are less likely to benefit
from a finding of fair use. Again, this is consistent with the expectation that
access to better lawyers should lead to better results, but it is inconsistent with
the hypothesis that fair use favors the underdog. It should be noted that this
finding is not particularly strong, however, given that it only holds at the .10
level of significance in the full specification in Model 5.136
In summary, the results in relation to Plaintiff Natural Person and
Defendant Attorney Underdog are contrary to the underdog theory of fair use. If
fair use indeed favored the underdog, one would expect to see natural-person
plaintiffs subjected to fair use less often and defendant underdogs prevailing on
the issue of fair use more often. However, the regression analysis reported here
suggests exactly the opposite; it confirms, if anything, the existence of an
overdog effect in relation to fair use litigation.
134 See supra notes 103-11 and accompanying text.
135 See supra Part III.B (discussing the origin of this view).
136 The fact that no similar effect is discernible for Defendant Law Firm Underdog also





As Table 1 indicates, the Plaintiff Industry variable is significant in Model 3
but not in Models 4 and 5, where industry variables are combined with party
status variables. Defendant Industry is not significant in either model. Further
analysis shows that there is a significant negative interaction between Plaintiff
Industry and Defendant Natural Person, Plaintiff Natural Person and
Defendant Law Firm Underdog.1 37 One interpretation of these results is that the
appearance of an industry effect in Model 3 is an artifact of other party
characteristics captured in Models 4 and 5. The industry effect disappears once
party status and empowerment characteristics are taken into account. Under this
interpretation, there is no evidence to support the industry effects hypotheses-
Hi1 and H12. This suggests that patent law scholars may wish to revisit
evidence of systemic industry variation in that field and consider whether other
factors relating to party status and empowerment are not more relevant than
industry.
E. Predicting Fair Use Outcomes
Is fair use predictable? The evidence presented here that transformative use
and partial copying are both strong indicators of fair use makes it difficult to
sustain the common charge of incoherence and unpredictability. 138 As
discussed, at least two aspects of the doctrine are coherent in the sense that, to
the extent we can measure them, transformative use and partial copying are
significant factors in favor of fair use.
The problem with fair use might be more about the way the statute is
written than the essence of the doctrine itself. Section 107 of the Copyright Act
lists several factors that are descriptively relevant, but do little to predict case
outcomes.1 39 The lack of significance of commercial use and the nature of the
work, combined with the subjectivity of market effect, may make fair use
appear to be more unpredictable than it really is. The fact that the Copyright Act
requires judges to consider these factors even though they have little or no
forecasting potential inflates their importance. If we simply put these factors to
one side and focus on the significant variables, the fair use doctrine begins to
look more comprehensible.
The extent to which fair use is actually coherent can be illustrated by
returning to the predicted probabilities derived from the final regression model
in Table 1. The overall predicted probability of a finding in favor of fair use is
137 The Plaintiff Industry * Defendant Natural Person interaction term is significant at
the .10 level. The Plaintiff Industry * Plaintiff Natural Person and Plaintiff
Industry * Defendant Law Firm Underdog interaction terms are significant at the .05 level.
138 For examples, see supra note 1.
139 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
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.38.140 This number increases progressively as additional favorable facts are
added. The existence of a Creative Shift increases the predicted probability of
fair use to .62. Adding the fact of partial copying expands the predicted
probability further to .68. Finally, adding the observation that the plaintiff is a
natural person increases the predicted probability of a finding in favor of fair
use to .87. These cumulative predicted probabilities are illustrated in Figure 4
(below).
Figure 4: Cumulative Predicted Probability of a Fair Use Win
IQ I
U-
AMl cases Transformative Partial Copy Natural Person P
+-One Standard Deviation * Predicted Probability
Source: OLS regression 5, infra Statistical Appendix, Table 2. N = 222. The factors are
cumulative, such that the "Partial Copy" includes Transformative, and "Natural Person P"
includes Transformative and Partial Copy.
As the figure illustrates, some case facts do actually have a significant
influence on the range of likely outcomes. The dashed gray line in Figure 4
represents a predicted probability of 50%. The presence of a Creativity Shift
indicating transformative use makes a fair use win more likely than not, but the
line extending one standard deviation below the mean still crosses the 50%
threshold. Combining two factors quite favorable to the defendant,
transformative use and partial copying, lifts the range of predicted probabilities
almost entirely above the 50% threshold. And of course, adding the additional
140This differs slightly from the simple average fair use win rate (.39) because not all




favorable variable of a weak plaintiff makes a finding in favor of fair use all but
inevitable.
These predictions are not iron-clad guarantees, they are simply estimations
of the approximate size of the effects. There will no doubt continue to be many
aspects of fair use litigation that cannot be captured in averages, generalizations,
or statistical approximations. There remains, in other words, a role for legal
doctrine, subjectivity, and advocacy. Although this study does not indicate that
the outcomes of fair use cases are obvious or mechanical, nevertheless it does
suggest that fair use is much more than merely the right to hire a lawyer and
take one's chances. Properly understood, fair use jurisprudence is fairly useful.
F. Alternative Explanations
Empirical analysis is a matter of both art and science. The data and analysis
presented here are open to multiple interpretations. In this section, I will briefly
explore some of those alternative explanations for the results presented thus far.
1. The Effect of Changes in Precedent over Time and Between Circuits
The first alternative explanation is that the patterns that emerge from the
case law are in fact driven by other factors, such as changing precedent over
time or even differences in precedent between the federal circuits. Figure 5
(below) illustrates why these factors might be important.
[Graphical material on following page.]
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The figure depicts a three-year moving average for the fair use win rate for
all federal district courts (dashed gray line), the Second Circuit (tightly dashed
black line) and all remaining circuits (solid black line). There are several points
of interest here. First, fair use win rates spiked up at the beginning of the
dotcom era in the late 1990s and remained high until 2010. The regression
models presented here attempt to control for a potential time effect by including
a dummy variable for before and after the Supreme Court's decision in
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.141 The results do not change in any
substantive way if that time dummy is confined to the period 2000-2011.
Another point of interest in relation to Figure 5 is that fair use win rates are
mostly higher in the influential Second Circuit than in the rest of the nation.
However, notice that other than in the periods from 1978 to 1984 and 1989 to
1991, the national trend and the Second Circuit trend have moved very closely
together. The main results are unchanged after adding a Second Circuit dummy
variable, except that Partial Copy and Direct Commercial Use are significant at
the .06 level instead of .05.




The second alternative explanation for the results explored in this Article
relates to selection effects. Any study that focuses on litigated cases naturally
raises the issue of potential selection bias. As Priest and Klein famously
observed, it is very difficult to make inferences about the broader universe of all
disputes by observing the very low proportion of cases that actually go to
trial.142 The time-consuming and costly process of litigation does not generate a
random sample of all potential disputes; rather, litigation acts as a filter,
selecting only those cases where uncertainty about the law, asymmetric stakes,
divergent expectations, or other quirks of human behavior have prevented the
parties from settling their dispute.14 3 All of the results reported in this Article
must be understood in this context.
The potential for selection bias notwithstanding, the fact remains that
litigated cases are important and they are constantly subject to ad hoc empirical
assessments. 144 Disputes that culminate in written decisions are the primary
source of information for lawyers and judges attempting to discover the content
of the law. Written opinions are particularly important because they provide
analogies and reasoning that can be extended to future cases. Lawyers and
academics constantly call upon their assessment of "what really happens" in fair
use cases to inform their understanding of the law. It is easy to overlook the fact
that these explanations are prone to the very same selection bias that qualifies
the findings presented in this study.
The unrepresentative nature of written opinions does not imply that scholars
should abandon the field of empirical legal studies, but it does call for some
caution in interpreting results. Empirical tools are extremely useful for patterns
within the observed data. More importantly, they also allow for assessments of
whether those patterns are statistically significant, according to conventional
standards, in the sense that they reflect a pattern beyond mere coincidence. 145
Readers should decide for themselves whether to draw inferences about future
cases or disputes that do not result in written opinions.
142 George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1984); see also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case
Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal
Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 581, 587-92 (1998) (discussing how the case-selection
effect complicates inferences made from plaintiff win rate data).143 See generally Robert H. Gertner, Asymmetric Information, Uncertainty, and
Selection Bias in Litigation, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 75 (summarizing the vast
literature following on from the Priest-Klein model). A related complicating factor in any
longitudinal study such as ours is that the selection effect may not even be constant as the
results of prior cases necessarily inform the expectations of future litigants.
14 4 See supra note 1.




This Article has undertaken a comprehensive empirical review of the fair
use doctrine in copyright law. This study goes beyond merely synthesizing the
content of fair use decisions: it reduces the fundamental aspects of the fair use
doctrine to a set of testable implications. In short, it enables an assessment of
the degree to which various claims, theories, and intuitions about fair use are
supported by the data.
This Article makes a significant contribution to the copyright literature on
the mechanics of fair use. To begin with, the evidence from litigated cases
analyzed in this Article confirms the centrality of transformative use. 146 A
transformative work is one that imbues the original "with a further purpose or
different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or
message." 147 Measured in terms of the variable Creativity Shifi, 14 8 it appears
that transformative use by the defendant is a robust predictor of a finding of fair
use. Likewise, the contrast between the significance of direct commercial use
and the insignificance of commercial use overall reinforces the dominance of
transformative use over other factors. The empirical evidence presented here
contradicts the assessment that transformative use is merely an ex post synonym
for fair use. 14 9
Second, the results of this study also confirm the significance of the
statutory factor that addresses "the amount and substantiality" of the
defendant's unauthorized use of the plaintiff's work.' 50 Although the effect is
not as large as was transformative use, there is clear evidence confirming that
partial copying weighs in favor of the defendant's assertion of fair use. At a
practical level, this reinforces the wisdom of minimizing the extent of
unauthorized use when relying on the fair use defense. However, it is also
apparent from the data that there are many strong cases of fair use involving
copying the entirety of the plaintiff's work. Technologies that rely on digital
processing of entire copyrighted works, such as Internet search engines and
plagiarism detection software, nonetheless present a very strong case for fair
use.
15 1
146 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (holding that the creation of transformative works lies
"at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space within the confines of
copyright").
14 7 Id.
148 Creative shift is an asymmetry between the works of the plaintiff and the defendant
such that one is more creative and the other is more informational.149 See, e.g., NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 50, § 13.05[A][1][b].
150 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2006).
151 See, e.g., A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 642 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding the
automated processing of the plaintiff students' work in defendant's plagiarism detection
software was fair use); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir.
2007) (finding that the automated processing and display of thumbnails of copyrighted
photos as part of a visual search engine was fair use); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d
811, 816 (9th Cir. 2003) (same).
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The third major contribution of this Article is demonstrating that there is no
evidence that commercial use (in contrast to direct commercial use) reduces the
defendant's chance of maintaining a fair use defense. As noted in Part III, the
presumption against commercial use expressed in dicta in the Supreme Court's
Sony decision is difficult to reconcile with private commercial incentives
copyright is designed to produce. Ten years later, this presumption was
implicitly rejected by the Court in Camp bell.' 52 The evidence contained in this
study indicates no anticommercial bias in fair use. There are sound doctrinal
reasons for unequivocally discarding the Sony presumption and the evidence
suggests that a majority of district courts have in fact already done so.1 53
Commercial/noncommercial simply does not appear to capture any meaningful
distinction in litigated fair use cases.
The fourth contribution is closely tied to the third. In addition to rejecting
the proposition that commercial use makes fair use less likely, the related view,
which characterizes the doctrine as a kind of subsidy or a redistributive tool
favoring the politically and economically disadvantaged, can also be set aside.
Regression analysis of the effect of party status variables on the probability of a
finding of fair use either failed to find the predicted underdog effect or found
exactly the opposite.
Together, these four findings tell us a great deal about the broader nature of
the doctrine. Fair use is not a timid exception to the rights of copyright owners
or a compulsory form of copyright charity; it is an integral part of the copyright
system. The right to make fair use of a copyrighted work is equally applicable
to Fortune 500 companies as it is to struggling artists. Fair use creates breathing
space for cultural engagement in the form of reinterpretation and remixing of
copyrighted content. Just as importantly, fair use also makes it possible for large
commercial entities to build tools such as search engines that make the Internet
work and to create platforms such as YouTube and Facebook for sharing
individual self-expression.
The final, and perhaps most important contribution of this Article is that it
offers considerable evidence against the oft-repeated assertion that fair use
adjudication is blighted by unpredictability and doctrinal incoherence. The
predictability of fair use is a question of central importance for copyright law in
the United States and around the world. Many in the United States criticize
what they perceive to be the mercurial nature of fair use-what they arguably
fail to see is the role that a flexible fair use doctrine has in smoothing out the
rough edges of copyright.
In 2010, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom commissioned a review
to determine whether the current intellectual property framework of the United
Kingdom might be inhibiting innovation and growth in the U.K. economy. 154
The Prime Minister noted that:
152 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584.
15 3 See supra Part V.F. 1.
154 See Hargreaves, supra note 9, at 1.
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The founders of Google have said they could never have started their company
in Britain. The service they provide depends on taking a snapshot of all the
content on the intemet at any one time and they feel our copyright system is
not as friendly to this sort of innovation as it is in the United States. Over there,
they have what are called "fair use" provisions, which some people believe
gives companies more breathing space to create new products and services.t 55
The Hargreaves report, commissioned by the British government, ultimately
recommended against grafting a U.S.-style fair use exemption onto English
copyright law because, in part, of the perceived uncertainty of fair use.
156
Instead the Hargreaves report recommends a number of specific exemptions
that follow the results of American fair use cases. 15 7 This approach will address
some of the most glaring problems with English copyright law, but it will also
probably ensure that the United Kingdom continues to lag behind the United
States in a number of technological fields.1
58
Although the Hargreaves Commission appears to have accurately
understood the potential benefits of fair use, it, like many American
commentators, has misunderstood and exaggerated the costs. Standards are not
necessarily more unpredictable than rules, 159 nor is flexibility the same thing as
unpredictability. The evidence presented in this Article suggests that fair use is
not nearly so incoherent or unpredictable as is conventionally assumed.
155 1d. at 44 (quoting David Cameron, November 2010, announcing the Review of IP
and Growth).
15 6 Id. at 44. Several countries around the world are considering adopting a fair use
provision in order to help copyright keep pace with technological change. Israel adopted a
fair use provision in 2008. Id. at 45. Singapore uses a multi-factor fair-dealing test that is
similar to fair use. Id. at 45. The Irish Government is explicitly considering moving toward a
fair-use-style doctrine. In the United Kingdom, the Hargreaves Commission on Intellectual
Property and Growth recently considered but rejected adopting a fair use standard. Id. at 43-
44.
15 7 Id. at 44--50.
15 8 As the Commission recognizes, under the existing European approach to copyright
exceptions, "new kinds of copying which have become possible due to advancing digital
technology are automatically unlawful." Id. at 43.159 See, e.g., Ted Wright, The Effect of Rule Determinacy on Deciding Contract
Disputes: Experimental Data and Network Simulation (Oct. 17, 2011) (unpublished





The data in this study consists of U.S. District Court cases resulting in a
written opinion published in the Lexis database where the issue of fair use was
raised and adjudicated. 160 The data includes rulings on preliminary injunctions,
motions, and cross-motions for summary judgment, bench trials, motions to
dismiss, and motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The data
includes all such cases decided between January 1, 1978 (the day the Copyright
Act of 1976 came into effect) and May 31, 2011.
B. Statistical Software
The statistical analysis for this study was performed in Stata/SE 11.1.
[Tabular material on following page.]
160 A search for the term "fair use" in the date range (01/01/1978) to (05/31/2011) in the
Lexis US District Court Cases database yields over 1000 initial results; however, the
majority of these are trademark cases and relate to a different fair use doctrine entirely.
Additional search terms such as "17 U.S.C. § 107" and "purpose and character" were used to
reduce the population to true fair use cases. Cases matching these terms were reviewed
individually to exclude cases where fair use is referred to in passing, but not adjudicated.
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C. Independent Variables
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Independent Variables
Range Mean Finding Mean Finding
nStandard Ran in Favor of in Favor ofDeviation Fair Use if Fair Use ifMax] variable = 1 variable =0
Creativity Shift .208 .407 [0 1] .593 .328
Commercial Use .799 .402 [0 1] .372 .487
Direct Commercial .461 .499 [0 1] .308 .470
Use
Creative Work .479 .500 [0 1] .437 .355
(Plaintiff)
Unpublished Work .279 .449 [0 1] .462 .375
(Plaintiff)
Partial Copy .436 .497 [0 1] .434 .341
Industry Separation .555 .498 [0 1] .452 .354
Natural Person .322 .468 [0 1] .582 .291
(Plaintiff)
Natural Person(Defedan 
.191 .394 [0 1] .426 
.368(Defendant)
Defendant




Underdog (Law .171 .378 [0 1] .368 .386
Firm Experience)
Post 1994 .657 .475 [0 1] .419 .361
N=222.
D. Alternative Analysis Using Linear Regression
Like Table 1 in the main text, Table 3 (below) reports the results of five
separate multivariate regressions analyzing the relationship between a finding in
favor of fair use and the various factors discussed in Part III. The difference
between Table 1 in the main text and Table 3 below is that the former reports
logitistic regression specifications whereas the current table reports Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) regressions. The dependent variable of interest in this
study is dichotomous-either the defendant's claim of fair use was successful or
it was not. Whereas a linear regression model attempts to predict the values of
the outcome variable along a straight line, the usual way to model dichotomous
dependent outcomes is to use logistic regression (or a logit model) to predict the
probability that the outcome = 1. However, as noted in the main text, rendering




Table 3: The Effect of Various Objective Factors on a Finding
in Favor of Fair Use (OLS Regression)
Regression Model
Doctrinal Basis Variable Finding of Fair Use
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Transformative .230** .268** .197* .190* .258**Use (.08) (.09) (.08) (.08) (.09)
-.075 -.094 -.068 -.073 -.080Commercial Use (.09) (.11) (.10) (.10) (.11)
Direct Commercial -.137* -. 145* -. 105 -. 113# -.132#
Use (.07) (.07) (.07) (.06) (.07)
.002 -.084 -.012 -.044 -.088
Nature of the (.06) (.07) (.07) (.07) (.07)
Work .058 .024 .015 -.001 .003
Unpublished Work (.07) (.10) (.07) (.07) (.10)
.067 .149* .065 .87 .146*
Amount Copied Partial Copy (.06) (.07) (.06) (.06) (.07)
.097# -.020 .045 .029 -.036
Market Effect Industry Separation (.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.06)
.003 .026 .023 .013 .047Campbell Effect Post 1994 .0 06 .2 03 .4
(.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.06)
Plaintiff Natural .319** .215** .266**
Person (.08) (.08) (.09)
Defendant Natural .056 .033 .049




Defendant Law .057 .059
Firm Underdog (.09) (.09)
.007** .003 .003
Plaintiff Industry (.00) (.00) (.00)
Industy I.001 .001 .002Defendant Industry (.00) (.00) (.00)
Constant .369 .367 -.047 .136 .088
R' .095 .206 .115 .142 .215
N(l) = 277, N(2) = 222, N(3) = 271, N(4) = 270, N(5) = 222. ** Significant at the .01 level,
* Significant at the .05 level, # Significant at the .10 level. Logit coefficients obtained using
Robust Standard Errors. Standard errors in parentheses.
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E. Circuit Differences
Figure 6 illustrates the proportion of fair use cases for each of the U.S.
Courts of Appeals. As shown, the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits account
for a majority of the cases in the dataset.




The upper illustration of Figure 7 depicts a three-year moving average for
the fair use win rate for all federal district courts (dashed gray line), the Ninth
Circuit (tightly dashed black line) and all remaining circuits (solid black line).
The lower illustration is the same except that it features the Eleventh Circuit.
Note that variation in the Ninth Circuit is more extreme and that the Eleventh
Circuit closely follows the national trend.
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Figure 7: Average Fair Use Win Rate by Circuit
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